



NPSIA

The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs



CIFP

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy

UKRAINE 2016

CONFLICT RISK DIAGNOSTIC



Andrew Regnerus | Ali Tejpar | Amanda Bergmann

Ukraine: Background

Since declaring independence in 1991, government corruption and economic turbulence have contributed to political unrest in Ukraine. With previous protests yielding little structural change, many Ukrainians have grown frustrated with the lack of action on promised reforms and are increasingly looking to EU integration as a way to move forward. In November 2013, deep political unrest erupted in the Euromaidan protests after former President Viktor Yanukovich abandoned an agreement that would have brought Ukraine economically closer to the EU and instead accepted a \$15 billion bailout from Russia. These protests erupted into the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, which resulted in the ousting of Yanukovich and progress towards increased EU integration. These new EU-friendly policies kindled tensions with pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine, who subsequently rebelled against the central Kyiv government by declaring autonomy through internationally-disputed referendums in March/May 2014. Tensions quickly escalated into armed conflict in March 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the pro-Russian separatist takeover of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the Donbass region. While the conflict settled into a precarious stalemate after the Minsk II Protocol was signed in February 2015, scattered skirmishes in Eastern Ukraine along with the Ukrainian people's continued dissatisfaction with the central Kyiv government pose a risk for a resurgence of violent conflict.ⁱ

Conflict Risk Diagnostic Indicators

Key: (+) Stabilizing factor; (-) Destabilizing factor; (±) Mixed factor

Very High Risk

History of Armed Conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - March 2014: Crimea's disputed referendum, forced by pro-Russian separatists, declares its intention to join the Russian Federation. Russia's annexation of Crimea shortly follows.ⁱⁱ - May 2014: Pro-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts declare independence.ⁱⁱⁱ - Since April 2014, clashes in Eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists and the Russian military against the Ukrainian Armed Forces have killed over 9,098 and wounded 20,732.^{iv} - Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine has produced upwards of 1.38 million internally displaced persons and 300,000+ refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing to neighbouring countries.^v - February 2015: Separatists break the Minsk II ceasefire and attack Debaltseve, a city in the Donetsk Oblast, forcing the Ukrainian army to retreat. The conflict has settled into a stalemate.^{vi}
Political Instability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Following the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, freedom of peaceful assembly was generally respected in government-controlled areas of Ukraine.^{vii} + The Ukrainian government has passed legislation to defend freedom of expression.^{viii} ± President Yanukovich's resignation in February 2014 placated protesters, but the new government has since struggled to implement aspects of promised security sector and economic reforms.^{ix} ± Concerns over minority rights have increased ethnic tensions. The Ukrainian government has repealed previous anti-Russian language laws, but distrust remains. In Crimea, Ukrainian and Tatar people report that authorities discourage the use of minority languages.^x - Government corruption is a serious problem in Ukraine. In 2014, Transparency International ranked Ukraine 142 out of 175 countries for their levels of corruption.^{xi} In a 2014 survey, only 4.8% of the respondents believed that corruption had been reduced, 31.8% said it has increased.^{xii} - An estimated 2.9 million people living in the Crimea and Donbass regions struggle to exercise their economic and social rights.^{xiii}
Militarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ± Ukraine's military expenditures accounted for 2.7% of GDP in 2015.^{xiv} Ukraine's 2016 budget allocates 5% of GDP for military expenditures.^{xv} ± Conscription increased Ukraine's army from 130,000 in 2014 to 250,000 by early 2015.^{xvi} ± NATO has condemned Russia's actions and has expressed its support for Ukraine. In addition to military drills in the area, NATO has helped Ukraine develop its security capacity.^{xvii} - Russia's military budget in 2015 was around \$84.5 billion, an 8.1% increase from 2014.^{xviii} - July 2015: The Ukrainian Defense Minister reports that the separatists' army is 40,000-strong, but such estimates are difficult to confirm.^{xix} The separatists are armed by Russia with Soviet-era, and more recent, military hardware.^{xx} Russian soldiers are also found operating in Ukraine.^{xxi}
Risk Assessment	<p>Russia's annexation of Crimea and clashes between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Russian-backed separatists have resulted in many casualties. Though the conflict has since settled into a stalemate, skirmishes continue as both sides intensify militarization. Russia has increased its military budget and continues supporting the separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine has also expanded its military budget, but at great economic cost. Continued conscription and economic woes may escalate political unrest. Given the unresolved tensions and growing militarization, a resurgence in violence is likely before the</p>

	<p>conflict is resolved. Political instability initiated the current conflict and Ukrainians still have little trust in their government. The current conflict has also exacerbated animosity between ethnic groups. Domestic political stability is contingent on the Ukrainian government's ability to fight corruption and enact reforms. Failure to do so may result in renewed protests and possibly another regime change. Kyiv must also find a way to resettle the millions displaced by the fighting in Ukraine. Ethnic minorities in Eastern Ukraine, specifically ethnic Russians, must also be adequately represented within the Kyiv government if reunification with contested areas is to occur.</p>
--	---

High Risk	
Population Heterogeneity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Ethnic composition of Ukraine: Ukrainian (77.8%); Russian (17.3%); Belarusian (0.6%); Moldovan (0.5%); Crimean Tatar (0.5%); Other (3.3%).^{xxii} - Ethnic composition of Crimea (based on the most recent 2001 Ukrainian census): Russian (58.5%); Ukrainian (24.4%); Crimean Tatar (12.1%); Belarusian (1.5%); Other (4%).^{xxiii} - Ethnic composition of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts (based on the most recent 2001 Ukrainian census): Ukrainian (58% and 56.9%); Russian (39% and 38.2%); Other (1.4% and 3.6%).^{xxiv} - March 2014: Crimea's referendum, held invalid by the United Nations, indicates that approximately 97% of voters are in favour of joining Russia.^{xxv} - May 2014: Referenda on the status of the Donbass oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, widely regarded as illegitimate by Ukraine and the international community, support independence.^{xxvi}
Economic Performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + March 2014: The IMF announces plans to contribute a financial assistance package of \$17 billion to help stabilize the Ukrainian economy.^{xxvii} + The EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Association (DCFTA) Agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 2016, will open free trade between Ukraine and the EU.^{xxviii} - The hryvnia (Ukraine's currency) lost 70% in value since 2013; its current value is US\$11.9.^{xxix} - Consumer prices inflation was at 12.2% in 2014 (previously -0.3% in 2013).^{xxx} - The GDP growth rate, which stabilized between 2011-2013, was -6.8% between 2013-2014.^{xxxi} - Exports to Russia, Ukraine's main trading partner, decreased by 56% between 2014-2015.^{xxxii}
Risk Assessment	<p>Ukraine's ongoing disputes with Russia have significantly deteriorated bilateral trade relations. The hryvnia's sharp devaluation since 2013, along with the rise in inflation, reflect Ukraine's unstable economy. However, the upcoming IMF financial assistance package, as well as the DCFTA Agreement with the EU, may help Ukraine recover their import/export losses. President Poroshenko faces numerous challenges in the wake of the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests to gain public confidence. Kyiv must tackle widespread corruption, restriction of civil liberties, and an unstable economy. The Ukrainian government may also face difficulties ensuring that the upcoming local Donbass elections in early 2016 are legitimate, impartial, and transparent.</p>

Moderate Risk	
International Linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + March 2015: The UN General Assembly holds the Crimea's referendum to be invalid by a vote of 100 in favour to 11 against, with 58 abstentions.^{xxxiii} + The OSCE has currently deployed unarmed civilian observers to monitor security concerns, cross-border movements, and human rights abuses at both Donbass checkpoints in Donetsk and Russian checkpoints in Gukovo.^{xxxiv} This mission is considered essential to establishing a sustainable ceasefire and peaceful resolution by both Ukraine and Russia.^{xxxv} ± Ukraine is actively working towards EU membership. Implementation of the 2014-2017 Action Plan, outlined in the 2014 Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, establishes conditions of EU membership alongside ratification by EU members. Ukraine remains a priority within the European Neighbourhood Policy and is becoming increasingly integrated with the EU. The EU does not recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea.^{xxxvi} ± Ukraine is also actively working towards NATO membership. In turn, NATO has denounced Russia's military action in Crimea as a breach of international law and vowed to support Ukraine through the Trust Fund Project, which assists with military and humanitarian logistics, communication, medical rehabilitation, and diplomatic support. NATO continues to cooperate with Ukraine in joint security decision-making processes through the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and has reinforced its advisory presence in Kyiv.^{xxxvii}
Environmental Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Ukraine has high levels of arable land. 68% of Ukraine's total soil cover is composed of Chernozem (highly fertile soil), making it the breadbasket of the Eastern European region.^{xxxviii}

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Ukraine implements the OECD's EaP GREEN strategies by introducing environmental taxes and extended producer responsibility schemes for waste management.^{xxxix} - Mass soil erosion due to poor land management degrades over 500 million tonnes of arable soil annually, valued at \$5 billion in losses.^{xl} This is not fully offset by new technology. - Changing rainfall patterns and higher temperatures indicate high risks of water stress and drought every 3 years.^{xli} The drought in mid/late 2015 lowered Ukraine's wheat output and net exports.^{xlii}
Risk Assessment	Tensions with Russia have escalated as Ukraine increasingly seeks to align itself with the EU and NATO, challenging Russia's regional security. Ukraine's increased ties with the West may offer sociopolitical and economic stability, but further risk deteriorating relations with Russia. Meanwhile, droughts and high temperatures have had a negative short-term effect on Ukraine's wheat production and exports which threatens its already turbulent economy.

Low Risk	
Demographic Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Declining population growth of -0.3% between 2013-2014 (previously -0.2% between 2012-2013).^{xliii} + No urban population growth between 2013-2014 (previously 0.1% between 2012-2013).^{xliiv} + Low youth bulge with 10.85% of Ukraine's total population between 15-24 years.^{xliv}
Human Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Access to improved water and sanitation (WASH) sources have remained stable, with increases noted in rural areas.^{xlvi} + No recent disease outbreak – but situation may change depending on IDP living conditions.^{xlvii} ± Slight decreases in primary school enrollment (-1%) and increases in secondary school enrollment (+1%) in 2014 despite lack of youth bulge.^{xlviii}
Risk Assessment	Data does not suggest that human development is an immediate issue. Nonetheless, the length and intensity of conflicts and mass displacement may result in long-term effects that warrant monitoring.

Internal Stakeholders	
Republic of Crimea & the Federal City of Sevastopol <i>(Sergey Aksyonov)</i>	Despite a lack of international recognition, Crimea has become an autonomous state led by pro-Russian Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov. Russian-armed militants continue to repress individuals, especially the Crimean Tatars, and reject Kyiv's central control. ^{xlix}
Donetsk People's Republic <i>(Alexander Zakharchenko)</i> & Luhansk People's Republic <i>(Igor Plotnitsky)</i>	The pro-Russian and anti-Kyiv Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) led by Alexander Zakharchenko and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) led by Igor Plotnitsky are both fragile and politically unstable. Power struggles, both internally and with other militant groups in the region, along with expanded arms trafficking and pro-Russian sentiments threaten to destabilize the tentative stalemate in the region. ¹
Russian Federation <i>(Vladimir Putin)</i>	President Putin's concerns about Russia's regional security are further exacerbated by Ukraine's increasing integration with the EU and NATO. With Ukraine's role as a buffer between Russia and Europe in question, Russia has escalated the conflict by supporting pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea. ⁱⁱ
Ukrainian Central Government <i>(Petro Poroshenko)</i>	President Poroshenko continues to oversee the ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine while addressing constitutional reform issues related to the Minsk Protocols' provisions for self-governance in Donbass. ^{lii} Poroshenko also faces numerous domestic challenges after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests, including: combatting corruption; protecting civil liberties; and stabilizing Ukraine's economy. ^{liii}
Other Internal Actors	The massive influx of IDPs may disrupt Ukraine's social, political, and economic stability. Various militant ethnic groups, including the Cossacks and Tatars, also continue to fight over competing territorial claims. ^{liiv} Local oligarchs such as Ihor Kolomoisky and Rinat Akhmetov continue to threaten Kyiv by sponsoring corrupt opposition parties and rigging elections. ^{liv}

External Stakeholders	
North American Treaty Alliance (NATO)	NATO has condemned Russia's actions and has publicly supported Ukraine throughout the current crisis in an advisory and financial role. NATO is evaluating

	Ukraine's membership and has signed multiple partnership agreements with Ukraine. ^{lvi} NATO is also considering expanding its presence in Europe. ^{lvii}
United States of America (USA)	The USA has coordinated sanctions against Russia and accused it of destabilizing Ukraine. The USA has also encouraged Ukraine's integration with the EU and NATO and expressed support for the current Ukrainian government. ^{lviii}
Ukrainian Diaspora	The diaspora provides economic support to Ukraine with over \$7.3 billion in remittances in 2014 (5.6% of its GDP). ^{lix} The diaspora has also been influential in mobilizing funding, military supplies, and political support to Ukraine's armed forces through NGOs such as Army SOS. ^{lx}
European Union (EU)	The EU remains an important ally to Ukraine through instituting diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia. ^{lxi} The DCFTA agreement, which started January 1, 2016, will allow the EU to help stabilize Ukraine's economy. ^{lxii}
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	Largest security organization in the world. Established in 1975, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine impartially gathers information and reports on general security, specific incidents, and human rights issues with the consent of both Ukraine and Russia. ^{lxiii} The OSCE has recently decried crackdowns on media freedom and hostility against reporters in Crimea. ^{lxiv}
United Nations (UN) & International Organizations	The UNGA adopted a resolution on March 27, 2014 reaffirming Ukraine's territorial integrity and invalidating the Crimean referendum. ^{lxv} UN agencies such as the OHCHR have been actively involved in the conflict through the deployment of human rights monitors in Ukraine to report updates. ^{lxvi} In March 2014, the IMF also announced plans to contribute a financial assistance package of \$17 billion to help stabilize the Ukrainian economy. ^{lxvii}

Scenarios	
Best Case Scenario	Russia withdraws support from pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine after its economy deteriorates under the weight of sanctions and low oil prices. The ceasefire outlined in the Minsk II Protocol holds as continued mediation brings the conflict closer to a peaceful solution. Ukraine's economy stabilizes and experiences positive GDP growth with the IMF and EU's financial assistance while Russia scales back gas price hikes. Political unrest subsides as the Ukrainian government makes progress on its promised reforms to address police and government corruption. The return and resettlement of Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons from the armed conflict begins. Government protection of minority rights and political participation facilitates a promising reconciliatory process between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in Eastern Ukraine.
Most Likely Scenario	A punctuated ceasefire continues between Ukraine, Russia, and pro-Russian separatist groups in the Donbass region. Ongoing efforts are made to fulfill the Minsk Protocols' provisions to withdraw heavy weapons and recognize local self-governance in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Despite this, the legitimacy of the local Donbass elections in early 2016 will be questioned by Ukraine and the international community. Popular challenges of the elections will result in further suppression of human rights and civil liberties in the Donbass region. Ukraine's economy will begin to stabilize with the IMF's financial support and the DCFTA agreement with the EU. Public trust continues to decrease as Kyiv faces challenges addressing widespread corruption and the restriction of civil liberties. The status of Crimea remains legally ambiguous, but effectively under Russian control.
Worst Case Scenario	Tensions continue to rise in the region as actors engage in provocative tit-for-tat signalling tactics. The increased porosity between the Eastern Ukrainian and Russian borders increases arms trafficking, escalating the intensity of violent outbreaks. The IMF's financial assistance fails to stabilize the war-torn economy, exacerbating Ukraine's socio-economic problems and political instability. Separatists capitalize on these weaknesses, allowing them to further challenge Kyiv's legitimacy and effective control. The Ukrainian government responds with increased repression, jeopardizing its integration with the EU. The status of Crimea remains legally ambiguous, but effectively under Russian control.

-
- ⁱ BBC News. 2014. "Ukraine Crisis: Timeline." November 13. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275>).
- ⁱⁱ Ibid.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid.
- ^{iv} Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2015. "Despite Less Fighting, Eastern Ukraine Still 'Highly Flammable,' UN Reports, As Death Toll Tops 9,000." *UN Newsroom*, December 9. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52771>).
- ^v Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. "The World Factbook: Ukraine." Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>).
- ^{vi} BBC News. 2015. "Ukraine Troops Retreat from Key Town of Debaltseve." February 18. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31519000>).
- ^{vii} Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2015. *Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2015*. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/12thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>).
- ^{viii} Ibid.
- ^{ix} Pifer, Steven. 2015. "The Unending Saga of Ukrainian Reforms." *Brookings Institute*, September 23. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/23-saga-ukrainian-reforms-pifer>).
- ^x Ibid.
- ^{xi} Transparency International. 2016. "Country Profiles – Ukraine." Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.transparency.org/country/#UKR>).
- ^{xii} Piechal, Tomasz. 2015. "Disappointment and Fear – The Public Mood in Ukraine." *Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)*, January 14. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/disappointment-and-fear-public-mood-ukraine>).
- ^{xiii} Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2015. *Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2015*. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/12thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>).
- ^{xiv} Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. "The World Factbook: Ukraine." Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>).
- ^{xv} Sputnik News. 2015. "Para Bellum: Ukraine's War Budget for 2016". Retrieved February 2, 2016 (<http://sputniknews.com/europe/20151224/1032257833/ukraine-war-budget-2016.html>).
- ^{xvi} Harress, Christopher. 2015. "Ukraine Military Defense Budget Seeks \$4B in 2016 To Help Fight East Ukraine War." *International Business Times*, September 1. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-military-defense-budget-seeks-4b-2016-help-fight-east-ukraine-war-2077291>).
- ^{xvii} North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2015. "Relations with Ukraine." December 8. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm#).
- ^{xviii} Harress, Christopher. 2015. "Ukraine Military Defense Budget Seeks \$4B in 2016 To Help Fight East Ukraine War." *International Business Times*, September 1. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-military-defense-budget-seeks-4b-2016-help-fight-east-ukraine-war-2077291>).
- ^{xix} ABC News. 2015. "Pro-Russian Rebels Amass Army Sufficient for 'Mid-Sized European State': Ukraine Defence Minister." June 9. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-09/ukrainian-rebels-have-army-the-size-of-small-european-state/6530828>).
- ^{xx} Grove, Thomas. 2014. "Special Report: Where Ukraine's Separatists Get Their Weapons." *Reuters*, July 29. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-arms-specialreport-idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729>).
- ^{xxi} Urban, Mark. 2015. "How Many Russians Are Fighting in Ukraine?" *BBC News*, March 10. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31794523>).
- ^{xxii} Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. "The World Factbook: Ukraine." Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>).
- ^{xxiii} State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 2001. "Ukrainian Population Census 2001." Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>).
- ^{xxiv} Ibid.
- ^{xxv} United Nations Press. 2014. "Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum Invalid." *UN Newsroom*, March 27. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47443#.VqQN5iorL4Y>).
- ^{xxvi} BBC News. 2014. "Ukraine Rebels Hold Referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk." May 11. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27360146>).
- ^{xxvii} Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. "The World Factbook: Ukraine." Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>).
- ^{xxviii} European Commission. 2015. "The Trade Part of The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement Becomes Operational On 1 January 2016." December 31. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1425>).
- ^{xxix} The Economist. 2015. "Still On the Edge." December 19. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21684171-economy-although-improving-remains-parlous-state-still-edge>).

- ^{xxx} World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators." Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>).
- ^{xxxi} Ibid.
- ^{xxxii} Bershidsky, Leonid. 2015. "Russia and Ukraine Finally Break Up." *Bloomberg View*, December 30. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.bloombergvie.com/articles/2015-12-30/russia-and-ukraine-finally-break-up>).
- ^{xxxiii} Human Rights Watch. 2015. *World Report 2015: Ukraine*. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ukraine>).
- ^{xxxiv} Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2016. "Mandate of OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk extended by three months." January 21. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.osce.org/om/217501>).
- ^{xxxv} Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. 2015. "Participation of Ukraine into the activities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe." Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/international-organizations/osce>).
- ^{xxxvi} Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. 2015. "Ukraine-EU Relations." Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/relations>).
- ^{xxxvii} North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2015. "Relations with Ukraine." December 8. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm#).
- ^{xxxviii} World Bank. 2014. "Soil Fertility to Increase Climate Resilience in Ukraine." December 5. Retrieved January 26, 2016 (<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/12/05/ukraine-soil>).
- ^{xxxix} EaPGREEN. 2015. *Economic instruments for managing environmentally harmful products in Ukraine*. Retrieved January 26, 2016 (<http://www.oecd.org/environment/outreach/EI-country-pilot-report-Ukraine-en.pdf>).
- ^{xl} World Bank. 2014. "Soil Fertility to Increase Climate Resilience in Ukraine." December 5. Retrieved January 26, 2016 (<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/12/05/ukraine-soil>).
- ^{xli} Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 2015. *AQUASTAT: Ukraine Country Report*. Retrieved January 26, 2016 (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/ukr/index.stm); World Bank. 2014. "Soil Fertility to Increase Climate Resilience in Ukraine." December 5. Retrieved January 26, 2016 (<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/12/05/ukraine-soil>).
- ^{xlii} Mungai, Christine. 2015. "Drought in Russia and Ukraine Threatens 30% Of Wheat Crop - This Could Have Unlikely Political Implications in Africa." *MG Africa*, November 3. Retrieved January 26, 2016 (<http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-11-03-drought-in-russia-and-ukraine-threatens-a-third-of-wheat-crop-and-this-has-unlikely-political-implications-in-africa>).
- ^{xliii} World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators." Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>).
- ^{xliv} Ibid.
- ^{xlv} Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. "The World Factbook: Ukraine." Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>).
- ^{xlvi} World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators." Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>).
- ^{xlvii} Ibid.
- ^{xlviii} Ibid.
- ^{xlix} Freedom House. 2015. *Crimea Country Report 2015*. Retrieved January 28, 2016 (<http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/crimea>).
- ⁱ Quinn-Judge, Paul. 2015. "Disorder Spreads Among Russian-Backed Ukrainian Rebels." *International Crisis Group*, July 16. Retrieved January 28, 2016 (<http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2015/07/16/disorder-spreads-among-russian-backed-ukrainian-rebels/>); Lokshina, Tanya. 2015. "Donbass Is Clinging to Illusion of Peace." *Human Rights Watch*, September 9. Retrieved January 28, 2016 (<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/09/donbass-clinging-illusion-peace>).
- ⁱⁱ Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. "Why The Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault." *Foreign Affairs*, October. Retrieved January 28, 2016 (<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Radio Free Europe. 2016. "PM Urges Vote On Ukraine Constitution." January 24. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-yatsenyuk-new-constitution/27508024.html>).
- ^{liii} Kuzio, Taras. 2016. "Euromaidan Dreams Deferred." *Foreign Affairs*, January 7. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-01-07/euromaidan-dreams-deferred>).
- ^{liv} Thoburn, Hannah. 2015. "Revenge of the Oligarchs." *Foreign Policy*, October 27. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/27/revenge-of-the-oligarchs-ukraine-elections/>).
- ^{lv} Ibid.
- ^{lvi} North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2015. "Relations with Ukraine." December 8. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm#).
- ^{lvii} Baczynska, Gabriela, and Wiktor Szary. 2016. "Poland Wants NATO Summit to Okay More Troops for Eastern Europe." *Reuters*. January 18. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-poland-idUSKCN0UW1T1>).
- ^{lviii} Milne, Seumas. 2014. "It's Not Russia That's Pushed Ukraine to The Brink of War." *The Guardian*, April 30. Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict>).
- ^{lix} World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators." Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>).

-
- ^{lx} Mackinnon, Mark. 2015. "Bypassing Official Channels, Canada's Ukrainian Diaspora Finances and Fights a War Against Russia." *The Globe and Mail*, February 28. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ukraine-canadas-unofficial-war/article23208129/>).
- ^{lxi} European Parliament. 2015. "Economic Impact On The EU of Sanctions Over Ukraine Conflict." October 14. Retrieved January 27, 2016 ([http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2015\)569020](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2015)569020)).
- ^{lxii} European Commission. 2015. "The Trade Part of The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement Becomes Operational On 1 January 2016." December 31. Retrieved January 23, 2016 (<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1425>).
- ^{lxiii} Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2016. "OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine." Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm>).
- ^{lxiv} Human Rights Watch. 2015. *World Report 2015: Ukraine*. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ukraine>).
- ^{lxv} United Nations Press. 2014. "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling Upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region." *UN Newsroom*, March 27. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm>).
- ^{lxvi} Human Rights Watch. 2015. *World Report 2015: Ukraine*. Retrieved January 27, 2016 (<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ukraine>).
- ^{lxvii} Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. "The World Factbook: Ukraine." Retrieved January 29, 2016 (<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>).